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STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION
As explained more fully below, Appellee Steven D. Maero disagrees that this
Court has jurisdiction over the appellants' assertions that the Trustee's sale of a
partnership interest to Maero was invalid.
STATEMENT OF ISSUES AND STANDARD OF REVIEW
Issue No, 1: Does the Appellants' challenge to an order of the bankruptcy court
approving a trustee's sale of assets constitute an improper collateral attack over which the
trial court and this Court have no subject matter jurisdiction?
Standard of Review: This issue is raised for the first time on appeal. "Questions
of subject matter jurisdiction, because they are threshold issues, may be raised at any time
and are addressed before resolving other claims." State v. Sun Sur. Ins. Co., 2004 UT 74,
% 7, 99 P.3d 818; Utah R. Civ. P. 12(h)(2). "The determination of whether a court has
subject matter jurisdiction is a question of law." Beaver v. Qwest Inc.. 2001 UT 81, ^ 8,
31P.3dll47.
Issue No, 2: Is this appeal made moot by 11 U.S.C. § 363(m) because the
Westland II Defendants failed to seek a stay of the Trustee's sale?
Standard of Review: "Ordinarily, [an appellate court] will not adjudicate issues
when the underlying case is moot. A case is deemed moot when the requested judicial
relief cannot affect the rights of the litigants.'' Brookside Mobile Home Park. Ltd. v.
Peebles, 2002 UT 48, % 16,48 P.3d 968 (citation omitted). "Because mootness is a matter
of judicial policy, the ultimate determination of whether to address an issue that is
1

technically moot rests in the discretion of this court." Ellis v. Swensen, 2000 QT 101, ^f
26,16P.3dl233.
Issue No, 3: Did the trial court correctly find that the right-of-first-refesal
provisions in the Partnership Agreement were ineffective post-dissolution and that
therefore, the Trustee's sale was valid?
Standard of Review: The interpretation of the terms of an agreement is a question
of law that is reviewed for correctness. Pack v. Case, 2001 UT App 232, f 16,30 P.3d
436.
Issue No. 4: In any event, were the right-of-first refusal provisions inapplicable
because, at the time of the Trustee's sale, there was no legitimate General Partner of
Westland IT?
Standard of Review: This was not decided by the court below, but can serve as
alternate grounds for affirming this case. See Dipoma v. McPhie, 2001 UT 61, % 18,29
P.3d 1225 ("[I]t is well settled that an appellate court may affirm the judgment appealed
from if it is sustainable on any legal ground or theory apparent on the record, even though
such ground or theory differs from that stated by the trial court to be the basis of its ruling
or action.").
Preserved: R. at 362:27,200-205.
Issue No. 5: In any event, were the right-of-flrst refusal provisions inapplicable to
the Trustee because she was not a "Limited Partner" under the Partnership Agreement?
Standard of Review: This was not decided by the court below, but can serve as
2

alternate grounds for affirming this case. See Dipoma v. McPhie, 2001 UT 61, f 18
Preserved: R. at 362:22, 138.
Issue No. 6: Assuming that the right-of-first refusal provisions applied to the
Trustee, did she substantially comply with those provisions?
Standard of Review: This was not decided by the court below, but can serve as
alternate grounds for affirming this case. See Dipoma, 2001 UT 61, at Tf 18.
Preserved: R. at 111-13; 363:25.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
I.

THE NATURE OF THE CASE.
The Appellee in this case is Steven Maero ("Maero"). The Appellants in this case,

Merrill Bunker ("Bunker"), Topaz Enterprises, Inc. ("Topaz"), and Westland II
Investments ("Westland II") (collectively, "Westland II Defendants"), are appealing an
order of the trial court, which found that Maero was the owner of a 2.5% interest in
Westland II, a limited partnership, and awarded him a judgment in the amount of
$45,000.00 plus interest.
The dispute in this case stems from the separate 1987 bankruptcies of Granada,
Inc., which was the general partner of Westland II, and C. Dean Larsen, the president ol
Granada and a limited partner (owning a 2.5% interest) of Westland II. In 1994, the
trustee of Larsen's bankruptcy case sold his interest in Westland II to Maero at auction.
The bankruptcy court approved the auction and sale. Several years later, Maero
attempted to obtain an accounting from Bunker, who was purportedly the new general
3

partner of Westland II, but was unsuccessful.
The proceeding below was commenced when Maero brought an action for an
accounting and a declaration of his rights and interest in Westland II. The Westland II
Defendants counterclaimed, seeking a determination that the trustee's sale to Maero was
invalid because it failed to comply with the Westland II partnership agreement. After a
trial, the court below found that (1) Westland II was dissolved at the time of the trustee's
sale and therefore the sale was not governed by the partnership agreement; and (2) Maero
was the owner of a 2.5% interest in Westland II. The trial court awarded Maero a
judgment in the amount of $45,000.00 plus interest. This appeal arises from lhat ruling.
H.

THE COURSE OF PROCEEDINGS AND DISPOSITION IN THE COURT
BELOW.
On March 30,1998, Maero commenced the proceeding below by filing a

Complaint in the court below, seeking a declaration and an accounting of his ownership
interest in Westland II. [R. at 1-4.]
On April 13,1998, the Westland II Defendants filed an Answer and Counterclaim,
seeking, among other things, to invalidate the 1994 trustee's sale. [R. at 5-42.]
On November 6,2002, the trial court held a bench trial on the matter, at the
conclusion of which the judge made a ruling on the record, finding in favor of Maero and
asking Maero's former counsel to prepare findings and a judgment.
On July 1,2008, successor counsel for Maero filed findings of fact and
conclusions of law, and a judgment, which were entered by the trial court on July 3,
4
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On July 18, 2008, the Westland

• K'Kin-

.v.-. .oiiceof Appeal [R .'
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STATEMENT OF FACTS
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mation of WestlandljL
1

onApnP*

Defendant/AppeUant Westland II is a Utah limit*.
. ,, i

.

•• . ..

-v^misnol

viianada'O, its general, partner, through Granada's

president, C Dean Larsen ("Larsen1*» i l ) e f \ F \ I ,iH»iMHHM |'
2.

The Westland II Certificate and Agreement of Limited hnrtnersbip i "Hie

Partnership An rermrr f *.~t-:...

he purpose of the business was \Xi ; qLL;e

approximately 220 acres of undeveloped-land in Salt 1 ,iAv (Ynmly tor investment and/or
tlcvf"lt*iiiiicnf, |hX attMHJUOJ,,)
3-

The Partnersh n • r»o • r -

"

' •'

- . : . ,ca ihe K • I lowing provisions regarding

termination and dissolution:
21,1 Termination and Dissolution of the Partnership. The Partnership
shfcll be terminated and dissolved upon the happening of any of the
following events:
The retirement, adjudication of bankrupt
the General Partner, unless within a period
v. , ^v^u^
from the date of such event, a successor General Partner is
elected by a vote of all Limited Partners,
°1 2

a dissolution and termination <

:

•

— u.i piullts

:

""The Defendants5' exhibits were not numbered with the rest of the record,,, but run
be found in the manila envelope with the record.

and losses shall continue to be divided among or borne by the
Partners during the period of liquidation in accordance with the
Provisions of Section 8 above. The proceeds of liquidation shall be
distributed as realized in the following order:
A.
To the creditors of the Partnership (other than secured
creditors whose obligations will be assumed or otherwise
transferred on the sale or distribution of partnership assets);
B.
To the General Partner in respect of any loans or advances
made by him to the Partnership;
C.
To the Partners (in equal priority) in respect of their shares of
any undrawn profits; and
D.
To the Partners (in equal priority) in respect of their capital
accounts in the Partnership.
[Id. at 000014.]
4.

The Partnership Agreement contained the following provisions regarding

the transfer of limited partnership interests:
18.1 Right of First Refusal. No Limited Partner may sell, assign or
transfer all or any part of his interest herein or any part of his interest
in the Limited Partnership without first complying with the terras of
this paragraph. Any sale made without so first complying shall not
be a sale of any interest herein or in this Limited Partnership.
18.2 If any Limited Partner desires to sell his interest in the Partnership
(other than a sale permitted hereunder), he shall first deliver to the
General Partner a written notice of the proposed sale setting forth the
name and address of the proposed purchaser, the purchase price
(which must be an amount specified in dollars, but which may be
paid either in a lump sum or in installments over an extended period
of time) and the terms of the proposed sale. The General Partner will
have the option, which may be exercised at any time within thirty
(30) days after the delivery of the notice of proposed sale. If such
option is exercised, the purchase price shall be paid in accordance
with the terms of the notice of proposed sale, and within ten (10)
days after delivery of the notice of exercise, an appropriate
assignment of the interest shall be executed and delivered to the
General Partner. If the General Partner fails to exercise such option,
such Limited Partner shall have the right to sell his interest in the
6

-1 icrslup \o the person named in the notice of proposed sale at the
and pursuant to the provisions set forth therein. However, if
-ii •• Limited Partner fails to exercise such right within sixty (60)
after delivery of the notice of proposed sale, such right shall
\ and such Limited Partner shall not thereafter sell to any
nterest without again complying with the foregoing

[Id at 000011 000'* :._,
5.

.ic Partnership Agreement contained the following provisions re. .--.i*: :i

the requirement i'or;» iransfen/e of > I united partnership interest to become a sulMituted
"Limited Partner":
•

•

•-'.;.
>JI.\ K i 18.2: No person who purchases the interest of any limited partner
ni the v :• tuc? <hip shall have the right to become a substituted Limited Partner
within ;:ic meaning of the Ac* v*;?K'-^ the written consent of the General Partner,
[Def.'sEx. L at 000012.;
From subsection 18. V An\ Limited Partner shall have the right to give, transfer,,,
assign or convey all or part of his interest as a Limited Partner, but the donor,
assignee or transferree [sic] shall only have the right to become a Substituted
Limited Partner after obtaining/the prior written consent of General Partner.
[Def.'sEx. 1, at 000012.]
r

Bankr
6.

Granada and La*

O ^^

Canada filed bankruptcy under Chaptei II u »he

United States Bank? upky Court for the District of 1 " *n

7.

On June 10, I {"K" L"«^*! •

*

/' i t ' •• -i .\ \ •> f" v

• -^M I -i ^ciu Nent a letter to all Line1

Partners of Westland II, resigning as General Partner. [Def.'s Ex 4 ]
111

h\ May 2(\ i W7, Larsen filed bankruptcy individually under Chapter 7 In

the United States Bankruptcy Com! for (he District
7

un

.- . ti

. .. „ 61 ^ [Def.'s

Ex. 3.]
9.

Mary Ellen Sloan ("the Trustee") was appointed as the trustee for Larsen's

bankruptcy estate. [Id.]
Bunker Begins Holding Himself Out as General Partner
10.

On June 18,1987, the Limited Partners of Westland II held a meeting to

elect a new General Partner. Bunker was invited to the meeting. [R. at 362:155-56.]
11.

The Limited Partners at the meeting voted for Bunker to become the new

General Partner. [R. at 362:156-58.]
12.

Not all of the Limited Partners attended the meeting or cast votes in the

purported election, as required by section 21.1(A) of the Partnership Agreement. [R. at
362:80-81,156-58.]
13.

Because no new General Partner was properly elected within six months of

Granada's bankruptcy, the bankruptcy dissolved Westland II. [Def.'s Ex. 1, at 000014; R.
at 362:81.]
14.

Nevertheless, after the June 18,1987 meeting, Bunker began holding

himself out as the General Partner of Westland II and exercising powers and rights given
to the General Partner under the Partnership Agreement. [R. at 362:128-36.]
16.

On January 20,1988, over 11 months after Granada's bankruptcy, Bunker

filed with the Salt Lake County Clerk a document entitled "Amendment of the Certificate
and Agreement of Limited Partnership ("the Amendment"). [Pltf. Ex. K; R. at
362:88-89.]
8

17.

l

. • nn u: . .v in purported to appoint Bunker as the "New General Partner"

of the partnership on behalf of theLii ? f

!

P'<»:'-

. Amendment is only

signed by Bunker. [Pltf.'s Ex. K.]
18.

•: ;M . K'-siMK-i! •;,:(, although he signed the document on behalf of

the Limited Partners, he had no knowledge of wh^i..-

Amendment had been

,j-;.:iMmously approved by the Limited Partners, but did not think that it had been | K ,i(
362:90.]
Bunker was unable to explain how be w;is nble n i sign, a* attorney-in-fact
.. j Partners, the document that appointed him the General Partner and
gave him attorney ~in-fae20.

• •

In acting as General Partner, Bunker did not liquidate tin: assets ot ihr

• • •- A

;

jquired under section 21.2 of the Partnership Agreement; rather,

he look action to acquire real proper

*.*:••*

•••M.

•-

i u:

-nimued to operate the

partnership for more than 14 years. [R, at 362:130-35; Brief of Appellants, nt (> |
Trustee's Salt i i\
21.

On or about August 29, 1994, ner a

-r-- ^ -

^

;

uianada ^

bankruptcy, tin < rustee filed with the bankruptcy court in the Larsen bankruptcy a
"Notice of Auction of Remaining Fstau u *_*N" • hcicmaiuK r^uce of Auction"),
which proposed to sell at auction assets of the Larsen bankruptv ,*st:i;
Larsen's 2.S% in West but 111. 1 he Notice of Auction set forth a minimum, bid of
$2,500.00 for the interest The Notice of A .in ion ;ils< i "•,rf l'i nth Hie terms of the sale: "The
9

terms of the sale shall be all cash or cashier's or certified check, payable by 5:00 p.m.
the day after the sale. [Pltf.'s Ex. M.]2
22.

The Notice of Auction was sent to all persons of interest on file with the

bankruptcy court in the Larsen bankruptcy case, including:
BUNKER MERRILL
5282 SOUTH 320 WEST
SALT LAKE CITY UT 84107

WESTLANDII INVESTMENTS
200 NORTH MAIN
SALT LAKE CITY UT 84103

[Pltf.'s Ex. L.]
23.

The Notice of Auction provided that "OBJECTIONS AND REQUESTS

FOR HEARING, if any, shall be in writing and filed with the Clerk of the United States
District Court, 350 South Main Street, First Floor, Salt Lake City, Utah 84101." [Pltf.'s
Ex. M.]
24.

Neither Bunker nor Westland II filed an objection to the Notice of Auction.

25.

On September 27,1994, the bankruptcy court entered an "Order Approving

Auction of Estate Assets" ("the Bankruptcy Court Order") which specifically found that
"notice of the proposed auction was properly given and that no objections ha[d] been
received" and ordered "that the trustee b e . . . authorized to auction the remaining assets
of the estate on the terms and conditions outlined in [her] motion and notice of proposed
auction." [Pltf.'s Ex. N.]

2

The Plaintiffs exhibits were not numbered with the rest of the record, but can be
found in the white binder with the record.
10

26.

There were no timely appeals from the Bankruptcy Court Order.

27.

On October 4,1994, Maero attended the scheduled auction and submitted a

winning bid for the 2.5% interest in Westland II. [R. at 362:161-62.]
28.

Pursuant to the Bankruptcy Court Order, the Trustee assigned to Maero the

2.5% interest in Westland II in exchange for payment of $2,500.00. [Id; Pltf.'s Ex. A.]
Maero's Attempt to Obtain Partnership Information
29.

On May 28,1997, Maero sent a letter to Bunker requesting information and

reports on the status of Westland II and its property. [Pltf.'s Ex. B.]
30.

Bunker replied by letter dated June 13,1997, indicating that he was the

General Partner of Westland II and stating, "I was aware that someone had purchased the
2.5% interest." [Pltf.'s Ex. C] The letter further advised that Bunker would not provide
the requested information because Maero was not a limited partner, and would not be a
limited partner until such time as Bunker so decided. The letter also stated that Bunker
had a right of first refusal. [Id.]
31.

On December 8,1997, counsel for Maero sent a letter to Bunker again

demanding the requested information about Westland II. [Pltf.'s Ex. D.]
32.

Bunker replied by letter, again refusing to provide the requested

information and stating, "As General Partner of Westland II, I hereby exercise my right of
first refusal under section 18, page 10 of the Westland II limited partnership agreement to
purchase the ownership of C. Dean Larsen (Steven Maero)." Bunker enclosed a check for
the $2,500 purchase price, plus interest, for a total of $3,300.00. [Pltf.'s Ex. R]
11

33.

Maero did not cash the tendered check. [Id.]

This Lawsuit
34.

On March 26,1998, Maero commenced this case by filing a complaint with

the court below, seeking a determination of his rights in Westland II and an accounting.
[R. at 1-4.]
35.

On April 13,1998, the Westland II Defendants filed an Answer and

Counterclaim, seeking a determination that the Trustee's sale was invalid. [R. at 5-42.]
Sale of Partnership Property
36.

In January of 2001, while the case was still pending, Bunker sold the

partnership real property for $38,500.00 an acre. [R. at 362:131.]
37.

Proceeds from the sale in the amount of $44,430.24, corresponding to the

2.5% interest at issue here, were deposited into a segregated account pending resolution
of this case. [Def.'s Ex. 13, at 4.]
38.

According to the Westland II Defendants, the amount in the account

currently is approximately $53,600.00. [Brief of Appellants, at 6.]
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
1.

This appeal should be dismissed on jurisdictional grounds. Before the trial

court below, and before this Court, the Westland II Defendants are challenging the
validity of a trustee's auction and sale that was approved by an order of the United States
Bankruptcy Court for the District of Utah. The Westland II Defendants failed to appeal
the Bankruptcy Court Order, but rather filed a counterclaim against Maero in state court
12

when he sought an accounting of his ownership interest in the limited partnership. This
constitutes an improper collateral attack on the Bankruptcy Court Order, over which the
trial court and this Court have no subject matter jurisdiction.
2.

Even if this Court assumes jurisdiction over this appeal, it should

nevertheless find that the appeal is moot under section 363(m) of the Bankruptcy Code,
which prevents the reversal on appeal of an order authorizing a trustee's sale from
affecting the validity of the sale where a party failed to obtain a stay of the sale pending
appeal and the property was sold to a good faith purchaser.
3.

In the event that the Court determines to reach the merits of the appeal, it

should affirm the decision of the trial court, finding that Granada's bankruptcy triggered
dissolution and termination of the partnership, which in turn rendered the right-of-firstreftisal provisions in the Partnership Agreement ineffectual. Therefore, the Trustee's sale
to Maero was valid. The plain language of the Partnership Agreement and governing law
support that conclusion. Moreover, even assuming that the partnership was dissolved, but
still "in existence" at the time of the Trustee's sale, the right-of-first refusal provisions
were nevertheless ineffective as they conflict with the liquidation scheme set forth in
section 21.
4.

Alternatively, this Court may affirm on grounds not reached by the court

below. Specifically, this Court can uphold the validity of the Trustee's sale to Maero by
finding that either (1) at the time of the sale, there was no legitimate General Partner with
right-of-flrst-refusal rights; (2) section 18 of the Partnership Agreement did not apply to
13

the Trustee; or (3) even if the section did apply to the Trustee, she substantially complied
with its requirements.
ARGUMENT
I.

THE APPELLANTS' CHALLENGE TO THE BANKRUPTCY COURT'S
ORDER APPROVING THE TRUSTEE'S AUCTION SALE, HERE AND IN
THE COURT BELOW, CONSTITUTES AN IMPROPER COLLATERAL
ATTACK OVER WHICH THE TRIAL COURT AND THIS COURT HAVE
NO SUBJECT MATTER JURISDICTION.
This appeal should be dismissed on jurisdictional grounds. Before the trial court

below, and before this Court, the Westland II Defendants are challenging the validity of a
trustee's auction and sale that was approved by an order of the United States Bankruptcy
Court for the District of Utah ("the Bankruptcy Court Order"). The Westland II
Defendants failed to appeal the Bankruptcy Court Order, but rather filed a counterclaim
against Maero in state court when he sought an accounting of his ownership interest in the
limited partnership. This constitutes an improper collateral attack on the Bankruptcy
Court Order, over which the trial court and this Court have no subject matter jurisdiction.
Although the issue of jurisdiction was not raised below, "[questions of subject
matter jurisdiction, because they are threshold issues, may be raised at any time and are
addressed before resolving other claims." State v. Sun Sur. Ins. Co.» 2004 UT 74,1J 7, 99
P.3d 818; Utah R. Civ. P. 12(h)(2). "The determination of whether a court has subject
matter jurisdiction is a question of law." Beaver v. Qwest Inc.. 2001 UT 81, % 8,31 P.3d
1147.
"[B]ankruptcy courts have plenary jurisdiction over 'core' bankruptcy
14

proceedings/' including "orders approving the sale of property." Plotner v. AT & T Corp.,
224 R3d 1161,1172-73 (10th Cir. 2000) (citing 28 U.S.C § 157(b)(2)(N)). Only the
bankruptcy court that approved a trustee's sale of assets of the estate has subject matter
jurisdiction to void the sale. In re Allnutt 220 B.R. 871, 884-85 (Bankr. D. Md. 1998).
See also In re Bragg. 2000 WL 33710886, at *2 (Bankr. D. S.C. 2000) ("[I]t is the
bankruptcy court, which approved the sale in the first place, that has the exclusive
jurisdiction to determine what interest in the debtor's property was sold, and has,
theoretically, the power to set aside that sale or afford other relief in proper
circumstances.").
As the Utah Supreme Court has held, "the appropriate method to challenge [a
bankruptcy trustee sale] is by appeal, not collateral attack." Warner v. DMG Colon Inc.,
2000 UT 102, *[{ 9,20 P.3d 868. In the Warner case, a party brought an action in state
court on a claim that had been previously sold by a bankruptcy trustee. The Court held:
[The plaintiff's] appropriate course of action would have been... if not
satisfied with the sale, to challenge it through an appeal. Instead, plaintiff
has in essence attempted to challenge the sale through this suit in state trial
court. This he cannot do. To hold otherwise would defeat the intent behind
the bankruptcy system.
Id at If 18.3

3

This Court has also recognized this principle in an analogous context. See Utah
State Tax Commission v. Echols. 2006 WL 147599, at *1 (Utah Ct. App. 2006) (finding
that state court attack on Tax Commission judgment, in response to garnishment
proceedings, was improper and that the district court had no subject matter jurisdiction).
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As in Warner, the Westland II Defendants did not appeal the Bankruptcy Court
Order approving the Trustee's sale; rather, they have attempted to challenge the sale
through their counterclaim before the lower court. However, if the Westland II
Defendants have any dispute over the validity of the sale, their dispute is with the Trustee
and/or the bankruptcy court, not Maero. Neither the lower court nor this Court have
subject matter jurisdiction over the Westland II Defendants' collateral attack of the
Bankruptcy Court Order.4
Maero anticipates that the Westland II Defendants will claim that they had no
notice of the auction or sale, and therefore, could not have appealed it. [See Brief of
Appellants, at 28 n.39.] This argument is without merit.
First, the Bankruptcy Court Order specifically found that notice of the auction and
sale was proper and was given to all parties in interest. Any challenge to the sale based
on the Westland II Defendants' alleged failure to receive notice should have been brought
to the attention of the bankruptcy court. One state appellate court faced with a similar
challenge stated as follows:
If the [appellants] were deprived of due process in this case, then the
bankruptcy court would have been the proper forum in which they should
have challenged their lack of notice of the proposed sale. We will not now
revisit the bankruptcy court's 1991 order, an order that specifically
concluded that all notices had been properly given.

4

Maero believes that the lower court, and this Court, do have jurisdiction over his
claim asserted below, which sought an accounting of his interest in Westland EL Thus,
this Court can affirm the lower court's ruling on that limited claim, but should not address
the arguments set forth by the Westland II Defendants, attacking the Trustee *s sale.
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Glenn v. Steelox Bldg. Systems. Inc.. 698 So.2d 142, 144 (Ala. Civ. App. 1997).
Second, the record does not support the Westland II Defendants' claim that they
had no notice of the auction or sale. The Westland II Defendants claim that the addresses
on the bankruptcy court matrix were incorrect because they had moved. However, the
burden is on parties in interest to maintain current addresses with the bankruptcy court.
See In re Eagle Bus Mfg., Inc.. 62 F.3d 730, 736 (5th Cir. 1995) ("The creditor is
responsible for notifying the debtor, trustee, or the court of any changes in her mailing
address to guarantee that she be given reasonable notice."). Moreover, it is clear that
Bunker had actual notice of the sale prior to June 13,1997 and yet took no action. [Pltf.'s
Ex. C ]
In sum, the Westland II Defendants' appeal is nothing more than a collateral attack
on a final, non-appealable order of the United States Bankruptcy Court for the District of
Utah. As such, this Court has no subject matter jurisdiction and should dismiss the
appeal.5

5

Interestingly, the lower court came close to identifying the jurisdictional problem
during closing argument:
I presume that if—that if—if this bankruptcy was still an ongoing
bankruptcy, there hadn't been a discharge, that this matter would properly
be in front of a bankruptcy court to determine whether—because it seems to
me that what your argument is and the thrust of the matter is . . . whether
this sale was a valid sale or not.
[R. at 362:195 (emphasis added).]
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IL

THIS APPEAL IS MOOT UNDER 11 U.S.C. § 363(m) BECAUSE THE
WESTLAND H DEFENDANTS FAILED TO SEEK A STAY OF THE
TRUSTEE'S SALE.
Even if this Court assumes jurisdiction over this appeal, it should nevertheless find

that the appeal is moot under section 363(m) of the Bankruptcy Code. "A case is deemed
moot when the requested judicial relief cannot affect the rights of the litigants " Ellis v.
Swensen. 2000 UT 101, U 25,16 P.3d 1233.
Section 363(m) provides that
[t]he reversal or modification on appeal of an authorization [of a trustee's
sale of estate property] does not affect the validity of a sale or lease under
such authorization to an entity that purchased or leased such property in
good faith... unless such authorization and such sale or lease were
stayed pending appeal.
11 U.S.C. 363(m) (emphasis added). In other words, if a party fails to obtain a stay of a
trustee's sale of estate property, and the trustee sells the property to a good faith
purchaser, then an appellate court has no power to later invalidate that sale. Section
363(m) will moot an appeal where the remedy being sought by the appellant affects the
validity of a bankruptcy sale. Raskin v. Mallov. 231 B.R. 809, 813-14 (N.D. Okla.
1997).
The policy behind section 363(m) is clear. As one court has noted, "sale orders in
bankruptcy cases are accorded a high level of finality." In re CHC Industries, Inc., 389
B.R. 767, 774 (Bankr. M.D. Fla. 2007). "Section 363(m) protects the reasonable
expectations of good faith third-party purchasers by preventing the overturning of a
completed sale, absent a stay, and it safeguards the finality of the bankruptcy sale." Id
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"Once the sale has gone forward, the positions of the interested parties have changed, and
even if it may yet be possible to undo the transaction, the court is faced with the
unwelcome prospect of 'unscrambling] an egg.'" In re CGI Indus., Inc., 27 F.3d 296,
299 (7th Cir.1994) (citations omitted).
The Westland II Defendants did not object to the Trustee's Notice of Auction and
they did not appeal from, or seek a stay of, the Bankruptcy Court Order authorizing the
auction and sale. The sale went through. The Trustee assigned the 2.5% partnership
interest in Westland II to Maero. There is no evidence in the record that Maero was
anything other than a good faith purchaser.
Importantly, ALL of the arguments set forth by the Westland II Defendants in
their opening brief, which Maero addresses below, ask this Court to set aside the
Trustee's sale, which occurred over 14 years ago and was approved by a final order of the
I
bankruptcy court. The bankruptcy case has long since been closed. Because any relief
that this Court grants cannot affect the validity of the Trustee's sale, the Westland II
Defendants' arguments are moot under section 363(m) of the Bankruptcy Code and
should not be heard.
Moreover, even if this Court were to "undo" the sale, no benefit would be
conferred on the Westland II Defendants; rather, the limited partnership interest would
merely return to the bankruptcy estate. It would not go to the Westland II Defendants.
For these and the foregoing reasons, this Court need not reach any of the
arguments that the Westland II Defendants are asserting in this appeal. The Court is
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without jurisdiction to hear the arguments, and even if the Court assumes jurisdiction,
section 363(m) of the Bankruptcy Code renders the issues moot. This Court cannot grant
the appellants any relief. However, in the event that the Court disagrees, it should
nevertheless affirm the decision of the trial court for the reasons set forth below.
HI.

THE TRIAL COURT CORRECTLY HELD THAT DISSOLUTION OF
WESTLAND H RENDERED THE MGHT-OF-FIRST-REFUSAL
PROVISIONS WITHOUT EFFECT.
"Utah law provides that the parties to a partnership may, through agreement,

designate those events upon which dissolution or termination shall occur." Amdt v. First
Interstate Bank of Utah, N.A., 1999 UT 91, ^ 9, 991 P.2d 584. The trial court correctly
found that the bankruptcy of Granada, the general partner of Westland II, triggered
section 21 of the Partnership Agreement, which states in relevant part:
21.1 Termination and Dissolution of the Partnership. The Partnership
shall be terminated and dissolved upon the happening of any of the
following events:
A.
The retirement, adjudication of bankruptcy, or insolvency of
the General partner, unless within a period of six (6) mouths
from the date of such event, a successor General Partner is
elected by a vote of all Limited Partners.
[Def.5s Ex. 1, at 000014.]
Based on section 21.1, the trial court found as follows:
And so consequently, the partnership is dissolved and that's the
status of the partnership and this agreement, consequently, has no further
effect, except to the extent that provisions in the agreement anticipate a
bankruptcy of the general partner or of the limited partner in this case also.
And that would lead us then to provisions in 18.1, which is the first
right of refusal on the sale. That provision does not seem to anticipate the
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effectiveness of that provision in the event there is a bankruptcy and a
dissolution, and so consequently, I would find that 18.1 has no effect.
[R. at 362:227-28.]
The Westland II Defendants concede that dissolution of the limited partnership
was triggered because no successor General Partner was elected by a vote of all the
Limited Partners within six months of Granada's bankruptcy. [Brief of Appellants, at
15-16.] However, they argue that the partnership was not "terminated" at this time and
was therefore still "in existence" seven years later at the time of the Trustee's sale to
Maero. [Id at 16.]
The Westland II Defendants assume, without setting forth any authority, that if the
partnership were dissolved, but still "in existence" in 1994, then all provisions of the
Partnership Agreement were still controlling and enforceable. [Brief of Appellants, at
16.] However, even assuming that the partnership was still "in existence" at the time of
the Trustee's sale, which Maero disputes, that does not mean that the right-of-first refusal
provisions were still in effect.
A.

Under the Plain Language of the Partnership Agreement and
Governing Law, Granada's Bankruptcy Effectively Terminated the
Partnership.

The Westland II Defendants argue that under the Uniform Partnership Act, a
partnership is not terminated on dissolution. [Brief of Appellants, at 19.] However^ the
Uniform Partnership Act is a gap-filler act that governs only when a partnership
agreement is silent on an issue. Thomas v. Price. 718 F. Supp. 598,605 (S.D. Tex. 1989).
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Furthermore, it applies to limited partnerships "except in so far as the statutes relating to
such partnerships are inconsistent" with it. Utah Code Ann. § 48-1-3 (now § 48-1-3(3)).
The Uniform Partnership Act does not apply in this case. The Partnership
Agreement is not silent on when termination of the partnership (and therefore, the
Agreement) shall occur. [See Def.'s Ex. 1, at 000014.] Furthermore, even if it were
silent, at the time the Partnership Agreement was executed, the Utah Limited Partnership
Act provided, in relevant part, that a partnership certificate filed with the state "shall be
canceled when the partnership is dissolved." Utah Code Ann. § 48-2-24 (1953) (repealed
in 1990) (emphasis added). Thus, the Westland II Defendants' argument that Westland II
continued "in existence," even after the bankruptcy of Granada, is without merit.
It follows that the provisions of the Partnership Agreement, except those
specifically incorporated into the dissolution and termination scheme, were rendered
ineffective and unenforceable when Westland II ceased to exist.
B.

Even Assuming the Partnership Continued in Existence Po stDissolution, the Right-of-First Refusal Provisions Were Ineffectual*

Even assuming that the partnership continued "in existence" post-dissolution, the
right-of-first-refusal provisions were ineffectual.
As noted above, the Partnership Agreement contains a section governing
dissolution and termination of the partnership. Specifically, subsection 21.1 sets forth the
triggering events for dissolution; subsection 21.2 details how the winding up and
liquidation of the partnership is to proceed; and subsection 21.3 makes it clear that
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partnership property will be liquidated in order to return to each Limited Partner his
investment. [Def.'s Ex. 1, at 000014.]
Once this section is triggered, the validity and enforceability of the remaining
sections of the Partnership Agreement is not clear. However, it is apparent that sections
that are not consistent with dissolution and "winding up" are ineffectual. For example,
section 15 of the Partnership Agreement sets forth rights and powers of the General
Partner. However, it is clear that the General Partner does not have some of those rights
and powers in the post-dissolution "winding up" phase (e.g., acquiring new property,
borrowing money, entering into new agreements). In short, those subsections were
I
rendered ineffectual by the dissolution. See Parduhn v. Bennett, 2002 UT 93, ^f 15, 61
P.3d 982 (finding that buy-sell provisions of partnership agreement did not survive
dissolution and were ineffective where partners had not expressly agreed that provisions
would survive dissolution).
Section 18, containing theright-of-first-refusalprovisions, was likewise rendered
ineffectual by the dissolution. One of the primary purposes of transfer restrictions on
interests in business entities is to limit the participation of outsiders in the business. See
Salt Lake Tribune Pub. Co., LLC v. AT & T Corp.. 320 F.3d 1081,1088 (10th Cir. 2003).
I
Where a partnership has been dissolved, and ongoing business ceases, the justification for
a transfer restriction is no longer present. In addition, the activities detailed in section 18
are not part of the winding-up activities that should occur during the "period of
i

I

liquidation" found in section 21. Furthermore, section 18 does not specifically state that
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it will continue to be effective post-dissolution.
Thus, even assuming that the partnership continued "in existence" postdissolution, the right-of-first refusal provisions in section 18 were trumped by section 2Ts
dissolution and termination scheme. The trial court correctly found that, at the time of the
Trustee's sale, section 18 was not in effect and therefore did not apply to the Trustee.
This Court should affirm.
IV.

ALTERNATIVELY, THIS COURT MAY AFFIRM THE DECISION OF
THE TRIAL COURT ON OTHER GEOUNDS.
Alternatively, this Court can affirm the trial court on other grounds. "|I]t is well

settled that an appellate court may affirm the judgment appealed from if it is sustainable
on any legal ground or theory apparent on the record, even though such ground or theory
differs from that stated by the trial court to be the basis of its ruling or action." Dipoma v.
McPhie, 2001 UT 61, f 18,29 P.3d 1225 (internal quotations omitted).
This Court can uphold the Trustee's sale as valid by finding that either (1) at the
time of the sale, there was no legitimate General Partner with right-of-first-refusal rights;
(2) section 18 of the Partnership Agreement did not apply to the Trustee; or (3) even if the
section did apply to the Trustee, she substantially complied with its requirements.6

^ e s e arguments further highlight the jurisdictional problems in this case. Maero,
a third-party purchaser, is in the strange position of having to essentially defend the
actions and/or inactions of the Trustee, who is not a party in this case.
24

A.

At the Time of the Trustee's Sale, There Was No Legitimate General
Partner with Right-of-First-Refusal Rights.

Section 18.2 of the Partnership Agreement requires a Limited Partner, before
selling his interest, to "first deliver to the General Partner a written notice of the proposed
sale setting forth the name and address of the proposed purchaser, the purchase price...
and the terms of the proposed sale. [Def.'s Ex. 1, at 000011.]
Technically, Westland II did not have a legitimate General Partner at the time of
the Trustee's sale, and therefore, there was no one for the Trustee to send a notice to.
Granada had filed bankruptcy and resigned as General Partner seven years earlier, and no
successor General Partner had properly been elected by a vote of all of the Limited
Partners, as required by the Partnership Agreement. [See R. at 362:80-81, 156-58; Def.'s
Ex. 1, at 000014.] Indeed, the Westland II Defendants concede in their brief that
Westland II was dissolved when an election for a new General Partner failed. [Brief of
Appellants, at 15-16.]
Despite not receiving ballots from all Limited Partners within six months, Bunker
began holding himself out as General Partner and proceeded to continue operating the
partnership. However, merely acting as General Partner was not enough to give him the
General Partner's rights under the Partnership Agreement. Because there was no
legitimate General Partner, no one heldright-of-firstrefusal rights under section 18, and
therefore, no action was required on the Trustee's part in order to comply with the
Partnership Agreement. This Court should therefore uphold the validity of the Trustee's
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sale and affirm the decision of the court below.
B.

The Right-of-First-Refusal Provisions of the Partnership Agreement
Did Not Apply to the Trustee Because, Although She Held All of the
Rights of a Limited Partner, She Was Not a Substituted "Limited
Partner" Under the Partnership Agreement.

Alternatively, this Court should find that theright-of-first-refusalprovisions of the
Partnership Agreement did not apply to the Trustee.
Pursuant to section 541 of the Bankruptcy Code, Larsen's bankruptcy estate
consisted of "all legal or equitable interests of the debtor in property as of the
commencement of the case." 11 U.S.C. § 541(a)(1). There is no dispute that the Trustee
stepped into Larsen's shoes and became the owner of a limited partnership interest in
WestlandU
But critically, assuming the partnership was even in existence, she did not become
a substituted "Limited Partner" under the Partnership Agreement. The Partnership
Agreement specifically states that "[n]o person who purchases the interest of any
limited partner in the Partnership shall have the right to become a substituted Limited
Partner within the meaning of the Act without the written consent of the General
Partner." [Def.'s Ex. 1, at 000012 (emphasis added).] This requirement was not met.
The Trustee merely held, on behalf of the bankruptcy estate, a limited partnership interest
and corresponding rights.
Section 18 of the Partnership Agreement states:
18.1 Right of First Refusal. No Limited Partner may sell, assign or
transfer all or any part of his interest herein or any part of his interest
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in the Limited Partnership without first complying with the terms of
this paragraph.
18.2 If any Limited Partner desires to sell his interest in the Partnership
(other than a sale permitted hereunder), he shall first...
[Def.'s Ex. 1, at 00001L] The transfer restrictions in the Partnership Agreement are
placed only on "Limited Partners."
The Trustee was not a "Limited Partner." She merely held a limited partnership
interest. The Partnership Agreement draws a distinction between the two, and does not
place any transfer restrictions on mere holders of limited partnership rights and interests.
This Court should find that section 18 of the Partnership Agreement did not apply to the
Trustee and affirm the decision of the trial court below.
C.

Even Assuming that the Right-of-First Refusal Provisions Applied to
the Trustee, She Substantially Complied with Them.

Alternatively, even assuming that the right-of-first refusal provisions applied to the
Trustee, this Court should nevertheless affirm the decision of the trial court and uphold
the validity of the Trustee's sale because the Trustee substantially complied with section
18 of the Partnership Agreement.
Section 18.2 requires a Limited Partner, before selling his interest, to "first deliver
to the General Partner a written notice of the proposed sale setting forth the name and
address of the proposed purchaser, the purchase price . . . and the terms of the proposed
sale.
The Trustee did send both Bunker and Westland II notice of the proposed sale.
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[Pltf.'s Ex. L, M.] The Notice of Auction gave the time and place set for a sale by
auction, identified the proposed purchaser as the highest bidder, and set forth a minimum
purchase price of $2,500.00. Furthermore, the Notice of Auction set forth the terms of
sale: "The terms of the sale shall be all cash or Ccishier's or certified check, payable by
5:00 p.m. the day after the sale. [Pltf.'s Ex. M.]
The Westland II Defendants attempt to draw great distinctions between a "pending
sale" and a "pending auction," and a "purchase price" and a "minimum bid." But
ultimately, these distinctions are irrelevant. The notice was sufficient to accomplish its
purpose, which was to notify the alleged General Partner of a pending sale so that he
could take steps to exercise any rights he claimed. Because the notice was sufficient in
that regard, the Trustee substantially complied with section 18 of the Partnership
Agreement.
CONCLUSION
Based on the foregoing, Maero respectfully requests that this Court dismiss this
appeal because the Court lacks subject matter jurisdiction and/or because the appeal is
moot under section 363(m) of the Bankruptcy Code. If the Court determines to reach the
merits of the arguments presented, then Maero requests that the Court affirm the trial
court's July 3,2008 Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, and Judgment. In the
alternative, Maero requests that the Court affirm on other grounds, detailed above, not
relied on by the trial court.

28

DATED this ^°

day of January, 2009.

McKAY, BURTON & THURMAN
Jeremy G(^nk
Attorneys ior Steven D. Maero

29

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that on t h e ^ Q L day of January, 2009,1 caused two true and
correct copies of the foregoing BRIEF OF APPELLEE STEVEN D. MAERO, together
with a compact disk containing a PDF version of the same, to be sent, via U.S. Mail, to
the following:

Stephen R. Randle
Michael L. Deamer
139 East South Temple, Suite 300
Salt Lake City, UT 84111-1169

wMx y -Qto^

30

